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Abstract
When foraging for information, users face a tradeoff
between the accuracy and value of the acquired in-
formation and the time spent collecting it, a problem
which also surfaces when seeking answers to a ques-
tion posed to a large community. We empirically study
how people behave when facing these conflicting ob-
jectives using data from Yahoo Answers, a community
driven question-and-answer site. We first study how
users behave when trying to maximize the amount of ac-
quired information while minimizing the waiting time.
We find that users are willing to wait longer for an ad-
ditional answer if they have received a small number of
answers. We then assume that users make a sequence of
decisions, deciding to wait for an additional answer as
long as the quality of the current answer exceeds some
threshold. The resulting probability distribution for the
number of answers that a question gets is an inverse
Gaussian, a fact that is validated by our data.
1 Introduction
When searching for an answer to a question, people
face a well known tradeoff between the accuracy of the
acquired information and the time spent collecting it.
The fact that it usually takes longer to find a better an-
swer to a given question creates a dilemma which is in-
herent in information seeking. Stopping the search for
information early provides swift answers which might
not be completely correct, whereas continuing to search
for longer usually provides accuracy and completeness
while sacrificing the timeliness of the answer. Worse,
if answers to a question arrive at random intervals, a
user seeking specific information that will inform a de-
cision to be made faces the problem of having to wait
for an uncertain interval of time in exchange for an an-
swer which may or may not improve on what is already
known.
Rather than study these issues in a laboratory set-
ting, we decided to do so in the natural context of the
Web. Specifically, we studied user behavior within
Yahoo Answers, a community-driven question-and-
answer site with more than 21 million unique users. At
Yahoo Answers, users post questions seeking to harvest
the collective intelligence of others in the system. Once
a user submits a question, it gets posted on the site.
Other users can then submit answers to the question,
which are also posted on the site. When the author of
a question is satisfied with the answers he has received,
he closes the question and thus terminates his search for
answers. He then uses information from the answers
he received to build his own “aggregate answer” to his
question, that will potentially help him take a related
decision.
There are two aspects that users value with respect to
the aggregate answers they obtain: accuracy and speed,
and thus they try to maximize the accuracy of their ag-
gregate answers without waiting too long. The accuracy
of the aggregate answer depends on the accuracy of all
individual answers that the question received.
Anyone posting a question faces the following trade-
off at any given point in time. He can either build his
aggregate answer at a given time or wait for additional
answers to arrive. If he waits, he may achieve a higher
accuracy in the future, but also incurs a cost for wait-
ing. The user’s intent is to build his aggregate answer at
the optimal stopping time. We take two complementary
approaches to the analysis of user behavior with respect
to speed-accuracy tradeoffs.
Our first approach studies the speed-accuracy trade-
off by using the number of answers as a proxy for accu-
racy. In particular, we assume that the user estimates the
accuracy of his aggregate answer by the number of an-
swers that his question gets. Thus, he faces the follow-
ing tradeoff: he prefers more to less answers, but does
not want to wait too long. We analyze Yahoo Answers
data to identify and quantify this tradeoff. Our first find-
ing is that users are willing to wait more to obtain one
additional answer when they have only received a small
number of answers; this implies decreasing marginal re-
turns in the number of answers. Formally, this implies
a concave utility function in the amount of information.
We then estimate the utility function from the data.
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Our second approach considers the qualities of the
individual answers without explicitly computing the
cost of waiting. We assume that users decide to wait
as long as the value of the current answer exceeds some
threshold. Under this model, the probability distribu-
tion for the number of answers that a question gets is an
inverse Gaussian, which is a Zipf-like distribution. We
use the data to validate this conclusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews related work. Section 3 describes Yahoo
Answers focussing on the rules that are important for
our analysis. Section 4 empirically studies the speed-
accuracy tradeoff by using the number of answers as a
proxy for accuracy. Section 5 we focuses on how users
assess quality. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Work
This paper uses Yahoo Answers data to study informa-
tion seeking behavior with respect to stopping when
people face speed-accuracy tradeoffs. In this section
we review related work.
A number of papers have studied information seek-
ing behavior on the Web. For instance, Efthimiadis con-
siders the search for health information [7], and Egusa
et al. study how people search when asked to complete
certain tasks [8]. Russell et al. present a search-task
taxonomy [16]. However, these papers do not explicitly
consider behavior with respect to stopping and speed-
accuracy tradeoffs.
The behavior of people with respect to stopping prob-
lems has been studied extensively in the context of the
secretary problem [6]. In the classical secretary prob-
lem, applicants are interviewed sequentially in a ran-
dom order and the goal is to maximize the probability
of choosing the best applicant. The applicants can be
ranked from best to worst with no ties. After each inter-
view, the applicant is either accepted or rejected. If the
decision maker knows the total number of applicants n,
for large n the optimal policy is to interview and reject
the first n/e applicants (where e is the base of the natu-
ral logarithm) and then to accept the next who is better
than these interviewed candidates [6].
Experimental studies of the classical secretary prob-
lem and variants show that people tend to stop too early
and give insufficient consideration to the yet-to-be-seen
applicants (e.g., [3]). On the other hand, when there are
search costs and recall (backward solicitation) of pre-
viously inspected alternatives is allowed, people tend
to search longer than the optimum [20]. We note a
key difference with the setting of information seeking:
while in the secretary problem only one secretary can be
hired, an information seeker can combine information
from multiple sources to build a more accurate answer
for his question. Moreover, in the secretary problem the
decision maker does not face a speed-accuracy tradeoff,
because time does not affect his payoff.
The speed-accuracy tradeoff has been considered in
various settings. One example is a setting where a
group cooperates to solve a problem [11]. In psychol-
ogy, on the other hand, the speed-accuracy tradeoff is
used to describe the tradeoff between how fast a task
can be performed and how many mistakes are made in
performing the task (e.g., [5, 19]).
There has been a number of empirical studies that
use data from Yahoo Answers and other question-
answering communities. Data from Yahoo Answers
have been used to predict whether a particular answer
will be chosen as the best answer [1], and whether
a user will be satisfied with the answers to his ques-
tion [14]. Content analysis has been used to study the
criteria with which users select the best answers to their
questions [13]. Shah et al. study the effect of user par-
ticipation on the success of a social Q&A site [17]. Aji
and Agichtein analyze the factors that influence how the
Yahoo Answers community responds to a question [2].
Finally, various characteristics of user behavior in terms
of asking and answering questions have been consid-
ered in [9]. To the best of our knowledge, there have
been no studies that consider user behavior in terms
of the speed-accuracy tradeoff in question-answering
communities.
3 Yahoo Answers
In this section we describe the rules of Yahoo An-
swers that are important for our analysis, and explain
why users often face speed-accuracy tradeoffs. We then
briefly discuss the data we use.
3.1 Rules
Yahoo Answers is a question-and-answer site that al-
lows users to both submit questions to be answered and
answer questions asked by other users. When a user
submits a question, the question is posted on the Ya-
hoo Answers site. Other users can then see the question
and submit answers, which are also posted on the site.
According to standard Yahoo Answers terminology, the
user that asks the question is called the asker, and a user
answering is called an answerer. In this paper, we study
the behavior of the asker, and thus the word user is used
to describe the asker.
Once the user starts receiving answers to his ques-
tion, he can choose the best answer at any point in time.
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After the best answer to a question is selected, the ques-
tion does not receive any additional answers. We thus
say that a user closes the question when he chooses the
best answer. Closing the question is equivalent to ter-
minating the search for answers to the question.
Questions have a 4-day open period. If a question
does not receive any answers within the 4-day open
period, it expires and is deleted. However, before the
question expires, the asker has the option to extend the
time period a question is open by four more days. The
time can only be extended once. However, most ques-
tions are not extended, and in our analysis we only con-
sider questions that were closed within the 4-day pe-
riod. If the asker does not choose a best answer to his
question within the 4-day open period, then the ques-
tion is up for voting, that is, other Yahoo Answers users
can vote to determine the best answer to the question.
3.2 Askers Face Speed-Accuracy
Tradeoffs
We expect that the user is satisfied with the answers he
received when he closes the question. The user then
uses information from these answers to build his own
aggregate answer to his question. Throughout the pa-
per, we use the term aggregate answer to refer to the
conclusion that the question author draws by reading
the answers to his question. The aggregate answer is
not posted on the Yahoo Answers site, and is often not
recorded.
Askers at Yahoo Answers are often asking questions
to get information that will help them make a decision.
In particular, the decision will be aided by the aggre-
gate answer. In many cases, the asker prefers to decide
sooner than later. For instance, this is usually the case
when the asker is seeking information on which product
to buy, because the sooner he decides what he is buy-
ing, the sooner he will get the product, and the sooner
he will derive value by using it.
As an example, we can consider the following ques-
tion from Yahoo Answers: “What is the best graph-
ics card for gamers?” In this case, the asker specified
his price range and what he wanted to use the card for.
The answerers then wrote their opinions on which card
would be the best for the asker. Then, the asker chose
the best answer and stated his decision on which card
he was going to buy. It is reasonable to expect that in
this case the asker would derive strictly higher utility by
having the graphics card sooner.
This motivates the speed-accuracy tradeoff. In partic-
ular, if the question has n answers, the asker can either
make a decision now using these n answers, or make
a decision later using more information. The cost of
waiting is the cost of delaying the decision.
We do not suggest that an asker closes his question
because of the speed-accuracy tradeoff. We just expect
that if an asker did close his question, then the closing
time provides a good approximation to the time that the
asker made his decision. We use the closing time in our
analysis to understand how users behave with respect to
speed-accuracy tradeoffs.
We next briefly discuss why an asker may close his
question. There are two motivations. First, this is a way
of thanking the answerer for his time and effort. Sec-
ond, an asker gets some points in the Yahoo Answers
reputation system if he closes his question. Clearly, not
everyone is sufficiently motivated to close his answers
in this way, and as a result many askers do not close
their questions. However, given that an asker did close
his question, we expect that the closing time gives in-
formation about how the asker behaved with respect to
the speed-accuracy tradeoff.
3.3 Data
We use a Yahoo Answers dataset that was crawled in
October 2008 by Aji and Agichtein [2]. For each ques-
tion in this dataset we know the time the question was
posted, the arrival time of each answer to the question,
and the time that the asker closed the question by se-
lecting the best answer.
For the purposes of this paper, we only consider
questions for which the best answer was selected by the
asker. The reason is that we are interested in the time
that the asker terminates his search for information by
closing the question. If the asker selects the best an-
swer, this is the time that the best answer was selected.
On the other hand, if the asker does not select a best an-
swer, we have no relevant information (we do not know
when and whether the asker built his aggregate answer).
Furthermore, we restrict attention to questions that
were open for less than 100 hours. This is motivated by
the fact that questions are initially open for 4 days (96
hours) and that most askers close their questions within
this 4-day period.
We thus use a subset of the originally collected data
that consists of questions that were closed by the asker
in less than 100 hours. This subset consists of 1,536
questions.
One could argue that there is no reason for a user
to close his question before the 4-day open period is
over. In particular, he could use the information from
the answers he has received up to now, but close the
question at the end of the fourth day. However, once a
user takes a decision (e.g., buys a product), there is little
or no value in getting additional information. Thus, if
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Figure 1: Histogram of the number of hours that ques-
tions were open (before the asker chose the best an-
swer).
the user is planning to select a best answer to his ques-
tion (in order to thank the answerer), he has no reason
to wait until the 4-day period is over. Indeed, Figure 1
shows that most questions close a significant amount of
time before the 4-day deadline. For instance, 29% of
the questions close within just one day after the ques-
tion was posted.
4 Speed-Quantity Tradeoff
A user wants to get an accurate aggregate answer (that
will potentially help him take a decision) without wait-
ing too long. The accuracy of the user’s aggregate an-
swer is subjective and hard to measure. In this sec-
tion we use the number of answers as an approximation
of accuracy. Thus, we expect that a user’s utility in-
creases in the total number of answers that his question
receives, and decreases in the time he waits for answers
to arrive.
Section 4.1 develops our hypotheses drawing on a
utility model. In Section 4.2 we test our first hypothe-
sis. In Section 4.3 we introduce a discrete choice model,
which we estimate in Section 4.4 to test the remaining
hypothesis. Finally, in Section 4.5 we discuss the form
of the utility function.
4.1 Utility Model
Let n be the total number of answers at the time the
user builds his aggregate answer. We assume that the
user gets utility u(n). Furthermore, we assume that the
user incurs a cost c(t) for waiting for time t. Thus, the
If u(n+ 1)− u(n) < E[c(T )], then close the question
If u(n+ 1)− u(n) > E[c(T )], then wait
Figure 2: Myopic decision rule.
user is seeking to maximize u(n)− c(t).
4.1.1 Myopic Decision Rule
Suppose that n answers have arrived. The user can ei-
ther terminate his search by choosing the best answer,
or wait for additional answers. If he terminates his
search now, he can build his aggregate answer using
the n answers that he has received, and thus get utility
u(n). If he chooses to wait and a new answer arrives
t time units later, then he will have n + 1 answers, but
will have also incurred a cost c(t) for waiting. His util-
ity will then be u(n + 1) − c(t). The user is better off
stopping if u(n + 1) − u(n) < c(t), and continuing if
u(n + 1) − u(n) > c(t). In words, the user decides
to close the question if the cost of waiting for one more
answer exceeds the incremental benefit of having one
more answer.
Our previous description assumes that the user knows
when the next answer will arrive, which is not the case
in reality. More generally, let T be a random variable
that describes the user’s belief on how long it will take
until the next answer arrives. Then, the user is better off
closing the question if u(n+1)−u(n) < E[c(T )], and
continuing if u(n+ 1)− u(n) > E[c(T )].
The strategy we just described is myopic, since it as-
sumes that a user decides whether to wait (i.e., not to
close the question) by only considering whether he is
better off waiting for one more answer. Alternatively,
if the user knew when each answer is going to arrive
in the future, we could consider a global optimization
problem: if the i-th answer is expected to arrive at time
ti, the user would choose to close the question at the
time tj that maximizes u(j) − c(tj). However, in the
context of Yahoo Answers it is impossible for users to
know when all future answers will arrive. It is thus
more realistic to assume that users myopically optimize
as randomness is realized.
We summarize the myopic decision rule in Figure 2.
It implies that a user is more likely to close the question
when u(n+ 1)− u(n) is small and/or E[c(T )] is large.
4.1.2 Hypotheses
We next develop our hypotheses building on the my-
opic decision rule. Our hypotheses can be grouped in
two categories. The first category is based on the as-
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sumption that the marginal benefit of having one more
answer decreases as more answers arrive; the second
considers how users estimate when the next answer will
arrive.
The user’s valuation for having n answers is u(n).
We expect that u(n) is concave, i.e., the marginal bene-
fit of having one more answer decreases as the number
of answers increases. According to the myopic decision
rule (Figure 2), the user is more likely to close his ques-
tion when u(n + 1) − u(n) is small. Since we expect
that u(n+1)−u(n) is decreasing in n, the user is more
likely to close his question when n is large, i.e., when
he has already received a large number of answers. We
test this in two ways, outlined in Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 1. The amount of time that a user waits
since the arrival of the last answer before closing his
question is decreasing in the number of answers that
the question has received.
Hypothesis 2. A user is more likely to close his ques-
tion if the question has received many answers.
The user believes that the time until the next answer
arrives is described by some random variable (which
can be degenerate if he is only using an estimate). It
is reasonable to assume that a user forms his belief us-
ing the information available to him, that is, the arrival
times of previous answers and the time he has waited
since the last answer arrived.
A particularly important summary statistic is the last
inter-arrival time, i.e., the time between the arrivals of
the two most recent answers. The last inter-arrival time
is an estimate of the inverse current arrival rate of an-
swers. Thus, the user may use the last inter-arrival time
as an estimate of the next inter-arrival time, i.e., the time
between the arrival of the last answer and the next an-
swer. More generally, the user may form a belief on
the next inter-arrival time that depends on the last inter-
arrival time in some increasing fashion. Then, if the last
inter-arrival time is large, the user expects to wait a long
time until he receives another answer, thus incurring a
large waiting cost. This encourages the user to close the
question now. This is the context of Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3. A user is more likely to close his ques-
tion if the last inter-arrival time is large.
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the
last inter-arrival time may be used as an estimate for
the next inter-arrival time. However, if a long time has
elapsed since the last answer arrived (e.g., a longer pe-
riod than the last inter-arrival time), the user becomes
less certain about this estimate. The increased uncer-
tainty may lead him to expect a greater waiting cost un-
til the next answer arrives. In turn, this encourages the
Corelation coefficient -0.148***
95% confidence interval [-0.196, -0.098]
Observations 1,536
Table 1: Correlation between the number of answers
(TotalAnswers) and the time that the user waits before
closing the question (ElapsedTime). *, ** and *** de-
note significance at 1%, 0.5% and 0.1% respectively.
user to close the question, as is outlined in Hypothesis
4.
Hypothesis 4. A user is more likely to close his ques-
tion if a long time has elapsed since the most recent
answer arrived.
Hypothesis 1 is tested in Section 4.2. Then, in Sec-
tion 4.3 we introduce a discrete choice model, which
we estimate in Section 4.4 to test Hypotheses 2, 3, and
4.
4.2 Time Between Last Arrival and
Closure
In this section, we test whether a user waits longer be-
fore closing his question when the question has received
a small number of answers (Hypothesis 1).
For every question we consider the following vari-
ables:
• TotalAnswers: the total number of answers that the
question received. This is the number of answers
at the time that the asker closed the question.
• ElapsedTime: the time between the arrival of the
last answer and the time the user closed the ques-
tion.
We test for correlation between TotalAnswers and
ElapsedTime. The results are presented in Table 1. We
find that TotalAnswers and ElapsedTime are negatively
correlated, bringing support for Hypothesis 1.
Table 1 suggests that the user is willing to wait more
(and incur more cost from waiting) for an additional
answer if only a few answers have arrived up to now.
This implies that the marginal benefit of having one ad-
ditional answer decreases as the number of answers in-
creases.
4.3 Model Specification
In this section, we introduce a logit model, which is
estimated in Section 4.4 to test Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.
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A user posts a question. Then, at various points in
time he revisits Yahoo Answers to see the answers that
his question has received, and decides whether to close
the question by selecting the best answer. We are inter-
ested in the probability that the user closes the question
during a given visit. For every visit we consider the
following variables:
• p: the probability that the user closes the question
during the visit.
• n: the number of answers that the question has
received by the time of the visit.
• l: the last inter-arrival time, i.e., the time between
the arrivals of the two most recent answers (at the
time of the visit).
• w: the time since the last answer arrived, i.e., the
time that the user has been waiting for an answer
since the last arrival. This is equal to the difference
between the time of the visit and the arrival time of
the most recent answer.
Recall the utility model introduced in Section 4.1. If
the user closes the question at n answers, his utility is
u(n). Suppose that the user believes that the next an-
swer will arrive in time T , where T is some random
variable. Moreover, we assume that the user uses the
last inter-arrival time l and the time since the last an-
swer w to form his belief; that is T depends on l and w,
and we write T (l, w). Then, the user expects to obtain
utility u(n+1)−E[c(T (l, w))] from waiting. Accord-
ing to the myopic decision rule (Figure 2), the user de-
cides whether to close the question or not depending on
which of the expressions u(n), u(n+1)−E[c(T (l, w))]
is larger.
We now perturb u(n) and u(n + 1) − E[c(T (l, w))]
with some noise. In particular, we assume that the
user’s utility is
u(n) + ǫ0
if he closes the question, and
u(n+ 1)− E[c(T (l, w))] + ǫ1
if he waits for the next answer. Thus, the probability of
closing the question is
p = P[u(n) + ǫ0 > u(n+ 1)− E[c(T (l, w))] + ǫ1]
= P[ǫ1 − ǫ0 < E[c(T (l, w))]− (u(n+ 1)− u(n))]
= F (E[c(T (l, w))]− (u(n+ 1)− u(n))),
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ǫ1 −
ǫ0.
Suppose that ǫ0 and ǫ1 are independent type 1 ex-
treme value distributed. Then, the difference ǫ1 − ǫ0 is
logistically distributed, and
p = Λ(E[c(T (l, w))]− (u(n+ 1)− u(n))),
where
Λ(z) =
1
1 + e−z
is the logistic function.
The previous argument gives rise to the logit model,
a standard discrete choice model in microecomics (see
e.g., [4]).1
In Section 4.4 we estimate the following model:
p = Λ(α+ β1 · n+ β2 · l + β3 · w), (1)
so that
E[c(T (l, w))]−(u(n+1)−u(n)) = α+β1·n+β2·l+β3·w.
This implies that the marginal benefit of having one
more answer when n answers have arrived is
u(n+ 1)− u(n) = αu − β1 · n (2)
and the expected cost of waiting for the next answer is
E[c(T (l, w))] = αc + β2 · l+ β3 · w (3)
such that
αc − αu = α.
Equations (2) and (3) are used in Section 4.5 to interpret
the estimated parameters of (1).
4.4 Model Estimation
We now use logistic regression to estimate (1), i.e., we
estimate the probability that a user closes his question
as a function of (i) the number of answers (n), (ii) the
last inter-arrival time (l), and (iii) the time that the user
has waited since the last answer arrived (w). We find
that the probability of closing the question increases
with all three variables, supporting Hypotheses 2, 3, and
4 respectively.
We estimate (1) assuming that users visit Yahoo An-
swers to check for new answers to their question every
hour after the last answer arrived. The maximum like-
lihood estimators are given in Table 2. All parameter
estimates are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
1If we assume a different distribution for ǫ0 and ǫ1, we get a dif-
ferent discrete choice model. The logit model is widely used because
of its simplicity. Another widely used model is the probit model,
which assumes that ǫ0 and ǫ1 are normally distributed. We note that
the probit model gives the same qualitative results as the logit model
for out dataset.
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Estimate
α -4.408*** (0.0603)
β1 0.027*** (0.0005)
β2 0.028*** (0.0002)
β3 0.021*** (0.0001)
Observations 54,914
Table 2: The effect of the number of answers, the last
inter-arrival time, and the time since the last answer on
the probability of closing the question with p as the de-
pendent variable. *, ** and *** denote significance at
1%, 0.5% and 0.1% respectively. Standard errors are
given in parenthesis.
We also used a generalized additive model [10] to fit the
data, which suggested that the assumed linearity in (1)
is a good fit for the data.
It is worth noting that our results do not heav-
ily depend on our assumption that users check for
new answers every hour. In particular, we get sim-
ilar estimates for β1, β2 and β3, if we assume that
users check for answers every 2 hours, every 5 hours,
or every 30 minutes. For instance, if we assume
that users check for new answers every 2 hours, we
get (β1, β2, β3) = (0.026, 0.027, 0.022) instead of
(β1, β2, β3) = (0.027, 0.028, 0.021).
We can now draw qualitative conclusions by consid-
ering the signs of the estimated coefficients. We use the
fact that the sign of a coefficient gives the sign of the
corresponding marginal effect (since the logistic func-
tion is increasing).
First, the probability of closing the question is greater
when more answers have arrived, which supports Hy-
pothesis 2. This implies that the marginal benefit of
having one additional answer decreases as the number
of answers increases, and is consistent with Table 1 of
Section 4.2.
Second, the probability of closing the question is
greater when the last inter-arrival time is greater, which
supports Hypothesis 3. The inverse of the inter-arrival
time gives the rate at which answers arrive. Thus, when
the last inter-arrival time is large, i.e., there is a large
time gap between the last answer and the answer before
it, the user may expect that he will have to wait a long
time until he receives the next answer. This perceived
high cost of waiting may encourage the user to close the
question sooner when the last inter-arrival time is large.
Third, the probability of closing the question is
greater when more time has elapsed since the last an-
swer, which supports Hypothesis 4. As more time
elapses since the last answer, the uncertainty increases,
since the user does not know when the next answer will
arrive. The increased uncertainty may lead him to ex-
pect a greater waiting cost until the next answer arrives.
In turn, this encourages the user to close the question.
4.5 Utility and Cost
The following lemma establishes a specific quadratic
form for the utility function.
Lemma 1. If (2) holds, then
u(n) =
(
αu +
β1
2
)
n−
β1
2
n2 + u(0). (4)
Proof. If (2) holds, then
u(n) = u(0) +
n−1∑
i=0
(αu − β1i)
=
(
αu +
β1
2
)
n−
β1
2
n2 + u(0)
We observe that the utility function given in (4) is
concave on [0,∞) for any value of αu as long as β1 >
0, which is the case for our dataset since β1 = 0.027
(see Table 2). Moreover, for any fixed β1 > 0 and
αu > 0, the utility is unimodal: it is initially increas-
ing (for n < ⌊αu/β1 + 0.5⌋) and then decreasing (for
n > ⌈αu/β1+0.5⌉). The latter may occur due to infor-
mation overload; after a very large number of answers,
the benefit of having one more answer may be so small
that the cost of reading it exceeds the benefit, thus cre-
ating a disutility to the user.Nevertheless, since ques-
tions at Yahoo Answers rarely get a very large number
of answers, the utility function given by (4) may be in-
creasing throughout the domain of interest if αu/β1 is
sufficiently large.
We note that from (1) we estimate β1 and α, but can-
not estimate αu. For the sake of illustration, we plot the
estimated utility u(n) for various values of αu in Fig-
ure 3, assuming that u(0) = 0. A reasonable domain
to consider is [0, 50], since questions rarely get more
than 50 answers. We observe that when αu is small
(e.g., αu = 1), then the estimated u(n) is decreasing
for large values of n within the [0, 50] region; suggest-
ing an information overload effect. On the other hand,
for αu ∈ {2, 3, 4}, the estimated utility function is in-
creasing throughout [0, 50]. Moreover, as αu increases,
the curvature of the estimated utility decreases, some-
thing we can also conclude from (4).
We next consider the cost of waiting. Equation (3)
suggests that the expected cost increases linearly in both
the last inter-arrival time l and the time since the last
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Figure 3: Estimated u(n) for αu ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
answer arrival w. However, it is not possible to get a
specific form for the function c(t) in the way we did for
u(n) in Lemma 1, because we do not have any informa-
tion on T (l, w). If we make assumptions on T (l, w), we
can draw conclusions about c(t). For instance, if we as-
sume that the user is using a single estimate τ(l, w) on
the time until the next answer arrives, then (3) implies
that
c(τ(l, w)) = αc + β2l + β3w.
Moreover, if the estimate τ(l, w) is linear in l and w we
conclude that the cost of waiting is linear. On the other
hand, a concave cost would be consistent with a convex
estimate, and a convex cost would be consistent with a
concave estimate.
5 Assessing Quality
Our previous analysis considers how the decision prob-
lem of the user depends on the number of answers and
time. There is a third aspect that affects the user’s de-
cision to close his question: the quality of the answers
that have arrived up to now. In this section, we use an
alternative model that incorporates quality, but does not
incorporate time and the number of answers in the detail
of Section 4. Our approach here is inspired by [15, 12].
Let Xn be the value of the n-th answer. This is in
general subjective, and depends on the asker’s interpre-
tation and assessment. We assume that the value of an
answer depends on both its quality and on the time that
the user had to wait to get it. For instance, Xn may be
negative if the waiting time was very large and the an-
swer was not good (according to the user’s judgement).
We model the values of the answers as a random walk,
and assume that
Xn+1 = Xn + Zn, (5)
where the random variables Zn are independent and
identically distributed. For instance, if the user just got
a high quality answer, he believes that the next answer
will most likely also have high quality. Similarly, if the
user did not have to wait long for an answer, he expects
that the next answer will probably arrive soon. We note
that (5) is consistent with the availability heuristic [18],
which leads individuals to judge the frequency of an
event by how easily they can bring an instance to mind.
Every time that a user sees an answer, he derives util-
ity that is equal to the answer’s value. We assume that
the user discounts the value he receives from future an-
swers according to a discount factor δ. Let V (x) be the
maximum infinite horizon value when the value of the
last answer is x. Then,
V (x) = x+max{0, δ ·E(V (x+ Z))}.
In particular, the user decides to close the question if the
value of closing exceeds the value of waiting for an ad-
ditional answer. If he closes the question, the user gets
no future answers, and thus gets future value equal to 0.
On the other hand, if the user does not close the ques-
tion, he gets value E(V (x + Z)) in the future, which
he discounts by δ. Depending on which term is greater,
the user decides whether to close the question or not.
We observe that V (x) is increasing in x, which im-
plies that E(V (x+Z)) is increasing in x. We conclude
that there exists a threshold x∗ such that it is optimal
for the user to stop (i.e., close the question) when the
value of the last answer is smaller than x∗ and to con-
tinue when the value of the last answer is greater than
x∗. The threshold x∗ satisfies E(V (x∗ + Z)) = 0.
From an initial answer value, the user waits for addi-
tional answers, with values following a random walk as
specified by (5), until the value of an answer first hits
the threshold value. Thus, the number of answers un-
til the user terminates the search is a random variable.
In the limit of true Brownian motion, the first passage
times are distributed according to the inverse Gaussian
distribution [15]. Then, the probability density of the
number of answers to a question is given by
f(x) =
√
λ
2π
x−3/2 exp
(
−
λ
2µ2x
(x− µ)2
)
, (6)
where µ is the mean and λ is a scale parameter. We note
that the variance is equal to µ3/λ.
We use the dataset to test the validity of (6). We find
that the maximum likelihood inverse Gaussian has µ =
6.1 and λ = 5.8. Figure 4 shows the empirical and fitted
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Figure 4: Empirical and inverse Gaussian fitted cumu-
lative distributions. The points are the empirical cumu-
lative distribution function of the number of answers.
The curve is the cumulative distribution function of the
maximum likelihood inverse Gaussian.
cumulative distribution functions. We observe that the
inverse Gaussian distribution is a very good fit for the
data.
An important property of the inverse Gaussian distri-
bution is that for large variance, the probability density
is well-approximated by a straight line with slope -3/2
for larger values of x on a log-log plot; thus generating
a Zipf-like distribution. This can be easily seen by tak-
ing logarithms on both sides of (6). In Figure 5 we plot
the frequency distribution of the number of answers on
log-log scales. We observe that the slope at the tail is
approximately -3/2.
6 Conclusion
This paper empirically studies how people behave when
they face speed-accuracy tradeoffs. We have taken two
complementary approaches.
Our first approach is to study the speed-accuracy
tradeoff by using the number of answers as a proxy
for accuracy. In particular, we assume that the user ap-
proximates the accuracy of his aggregate answer by the
number of answers that his question gets. Thus, the
user faces the following tradeoff: he prefers more to
less answers, but does not want to wait too long. We an-
alyze Yahoo Answers data to identify and quantify this
tradeoff. We find that users are willing to wait longer
to obtain one additional answer when they have only
received a small number of answers; this implies de-
creasing marginal returns in the number of answers, or
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Figure 5: The frequency distribution of the number of
answers on log-log scales.
equivalently, a concave utility function. We then esti-
mate the utility function from the data.
Our second approach focuses on how users assess
the qualities of the individual answers without explic-
itly considering the cost of waiting. We assume that
users make a sequence of decisions to wait for another
answer, deciding to wait as long as the current answer
exceeds some threshold in value. Under this model, the
probability distribution for the number of answers that
a question gets is an inverse Gaussian, which is a Zipf-
like distribution. We use the data to validate this con-
clusion.
It remains an open question how to combine these
two approaches in order to study the speed-accuracy
tradeoff by jointly considering the number of answers,
their qualities, and their arrival times.
We conclude by noting that our results could be used
by Yahoo Answers or other question-answering sites
to prioritize the way questions are shown to potential
answerers in order to maximize social surplus. The
key observation is that a question receives answers at a
higher rate when it is shown on the first page at Yahoo
Answers. On the other hand, the rate at which answers
are received also depends on the quality of the question.
Using appropriate information about these rates as well
as the utility function estimated in this paper, the site
can position open questions with the objective of maxi-
mizing the sum of users’ utilities.
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